The books reviewed here provide a basis for evaluating international humanitarian law (IHL) and the related crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity prior to 9/11 and serve as a benchmark for assessing the value of international humanitarian law norms in an age when the Bush administration has rejected many of the most fundamental norms. However, the author argues that these works of analytic jurisprudence ought to take political factors into consideration in assessing why these norms are both under challenge and under possible revision. Furthermore, a methodology of political jurisprudence, represented by this review essay, suggests that the books' presumption for prosecution IHL norms is impractical. Alternatives to prosecuting these norms, such as establishing truth commissions and using customary justice, are more likely to achieve some of the desired IHLgoals of ending impunity, adjusting historical memory, and providing a sense of justice to victims.
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Background on International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
The rule of law is a liberal precept, based on adherence to norms that contain public behavior. How to define the rule of law is controversial because of debates over what is law itself, as well as how to resolve legal controversies before judges, legislators, and executives. Pragmatists argue against abstract principles, for example, whereas naturalists emphasize justice. However, much of the concerns with establishing and maintaining the rule of law concerns establishing a basically functioning legal system, both in courts and in the administration of justice. In international law generally and the law of armed conflict in particular, this is particularly challenging, given that the dominant scholarly paradigm, realism, indicates that states will (and should) depart from international laws when their national security is at risk (Hendrickson, 1997) .
At the heart of the liberal paradigm, IHL comprises the treaty and customary rules and principles restricting the use of violence and permitting humanitarian assistance during armed conflicts (for summaries, see Askar, 2004; Byers, 2005) . In addition to such soft and hard laws as the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868, Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the 1949 and much of 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II, and the other Red Cross Conventions, IHL now includes the additional subject matter of these books. For nearly 140 years, IHL governing the laws of armed conflict has emerged as an important factor limiting unnecessary, indiscriminate, disproportionate, and other inhumane methods of war. Since 1949, IHL has been bolstered by the new laws on crimes against humanity and genocide, which theoretically can occur any time but which almost always also occur during armed conflict. Then, as in the 1990s, the engagement of international criminal tribunals (Tokyo and Nuremberg in the late 1940s and Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the mid-to late 1990s) to prosecute war crimes from recent wars coincided with the establishment or clarification of these norms. Most wars are not accompanied by tribunals, humanitarian interventions, or unconditional surrenders, conditions that foster international judicial intervention and norm clarification. Since the 1991 Gulf War, armed conflict sometimes has become increasingly constrained during combat and subject to prosecution for crimes committed. During the U.S. direct participation in the Vietnam War, the United States was criticized for IHL violations by murdering and torturing soldiers and noncombatant civilians, in violation of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Although the prosecution of Lt. William Calley drew much attention, after Seymour Hersch's revelations about the My Lai massacre, most IHL violations by both sides were not. Televised atrocities caused public concern, though not necessarily because they violated international law. However, a crucial change in the early 1990s was that the wanton human suffering caused by the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia provoked international outrage just because international criminal law was violated. The scholarship under review shows that the development of international criminal institutions, along with nongovernmental organization (NGO) analysis and activism, has been as crucial as the major powers' apparent conclusion that enforcement was in their mutual, enlightened self-interest. Perhaps the Bush administration has abandoned reciprocity in the war on terrorism on the theory that terrorists do not reciprocate. The problem is that other states inclined to reciprocate may not feel so obligated in the future. Furthermore, if inducing the Arab states to democratize is a major goal of regional counterterrorism, the Abu Ghraib scandal and associated IHL violations completely undermine the perceived legitimacy and prestige of the U.S. sponsorship and thus the effectiveness implied by self-interested national policies.
Although the two former conditions, institutions and NGO activism, appear to represent more robust political-legal changes, U.S. support for taking humanitarian action, through intervention, law enforcement, and prosecution, has proven more fickle. Because IHL issues began to come of age during and after the Vietnam War, states have also tried to both minimize atrocities and television coverage of combat so that violations will not be noticed. When the U.S.-led coalition liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, the United States announced that it had avoided atrocities, demonstrating the importance it attached to IHL. Similarly, the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda and crimes against humanity in Somalia, Tajikistan, and Kosovo, among many wars, were condemned. Of course, limits to the development of IHL consciousness exist when it is perceived to conflict with state interests. For example, about 2 years ago before the 2000 U.S. presidential election, then-likely-candidate John Kerry commented on the NBC-TV show Meet the Press that he admitted to committing war crimes as a naval officer in the Vietnam War but that he did not see any purpose served in prosecuting anyone in the United States for those crimes, even though crimes against humanity have no statute of limitations. Similarly, the U.S. media have portrayed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation as largely avoiding noncollateral, civilian casualties, a presumption challenged by video on the al-Jazeera network and some independent investigations, particularly in the U.S. counterinsurgency.
In addition to IHL, the 1946 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg defined crimes against humanity, whereas the 1948 Genocide Convention, which began to enter into force in 1950, has established the most grave crimes against humanity: genocide. Half a century later, Article 7 of the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) defined crimes against humanity, with genocide regulated in Article 6 and with the war crimes in IHL in Article 8. These reflect the experience of developing the statutes and case law of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the military justice systems of the major powers, and the legal arguments of NGOs and scholars also participating in the 1998 Rome Conference on the ICC. 1 IHL limits force against civilians and detainees, thereby substituting zones of peace-like politics while attempting to end cycles of violence with impunity. Universal in application of both the protections and the crimes that can be prosecuted, IHL's nondiscriminatory principles and rules theoretically enhance expectations of reciprocity and positive-sum cooperation in international and domestic politics, enhancing human, domestic, and international security.
Much of the public debates about contemporary developments in IHL have concerned the very legitimacy of these institutions, such as the ambivalence and occasional initial opposition of two consecutive U.S. administrations to the ICC and the concept of universal jurisdiction on which it and the Genocide Convention are based. There is no political consensus whether we have legal mandates under IHL to pursue those committing crimes against humanity under the rubric of criminal justice, war, or both, or something yet to be defined. In the most important war crime trial in Europe since Nuremberg, the Slobodan Miloševic trial has notably been bedeviled by procedural abnormalities by the pro se defense attorney, the resignation and death of the chief judge, and the apparent boycott of dozens of defense witnesses after a defendant attorney had been imposed. These developments have discredited the reputation of both international criminal tribunals and IHL. Yet most of the books under study, however, accept the legalistic postulate that international and domestic politics should follow the rubrics of the rule of law.
Alleged U.S. Violations of IHL
In terms of the realist paradigm's "law of power," compared with the liberal presumption of the "power of law," these IHL institutions are evolving semiautonomously in spite of U.S. antagonism and also paradoxically because of U.S. support. The Bush administration has somewhat supported international prosecution at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as in the hybrid tribunals in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia (though not in Iraq, where a domestic process has been established, presumably because U.S. forces are so intimately involved). However, the United States has apparently succeeded in inducing the closure of ICTY/ICTR trials by a 2007 deadline. The United States has argued controversially for both denying habeus corpus and for detaining terrorism suspects indefinitely, either because they were deemed unlawful combatants not covered by the Geneva Conventions or because they are lawful combatants and are therefore prisoners of war (POWs). The latter, the United States further contends, can be detained until the end of a war on terrorism, which probably cannot ever end except in global suicide. Yet the United States has discovered that if it is to be successful in Iraq and in many other arenas of the war against terrorism, then it cannot willy-nilly reject core IHL principles. The resistance in Iraq, the noncooperation of Germany and France in peacekeeping in Iraq, and the threat of arrests of U.S. officials for crimes against humanity are just some of the examples of the costs of U.S. lawlessness. Furthermore, the potential publication of digital photographs of torture at Abu Ghraib is just the latest manifestation of the "CNN effect" (Stroebel, 1996) . War conducted in ways contradicting IHL can lead to political reversals in support of those legal rules, particularly when opposing political forces either believe in the legitimacy of IHL or find it expedient to use rhetoric espousing IHL. On the other hand, the U.S. public opinion has not long clamored for prosecutions for torture, whether allegedly by domestic police forces or the U.S. military and intelligence forces overseas at Guantánamo or Abu Ghraib or throughout the world (Bandes, 1999; Conroy, 2000) . In particular, international law has outlawed torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the Torture Convention and various other human rights treaties. Yet the Bush administration has succeeded in avoiding domestic legal accountability for cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Even after many revisions in U.S. military and intelligence rules governing the treatment of detainees, examples of approved U.S. practices, at the time of writing (June 2005), include water boarding, use of menacing dogs, threatening to kill family members, and sexual humiliation, all of which the Bush administration implicitly hinted or explicitly argued do not rise to prohibited torture. Inhuman treatment is categorically prohibited in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is binding under customary international law, as well as in the following treaties that the United States has ratified: the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Torture Convention, as well as those that the United States has not ratified: the European, American, and African Human Rights Conventions and the ICC statute. The Bush administration has to date succeeded in claiming that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment was permitted and that many practices considered by many as torture are really just cruel, inhuman, or degrading. Of course, the "degrading treatment" criterion is the easiest to meet and consequently more difficult to prosecute. Also of note, the use of the article or as opposed to and means that that any degrading treatment ostensibly violates the Torture Convention. Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture requires the United States to undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
The Bush administration argues that Article 16 of the Torture Convention does not apply to overseas detainees, even though the U.S. statute prohibits torture, defined as "specifically intended to inflict severe physical and mental pain or suffering, (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person in his custody or physical control." 2 These arguments have been carefully documented and contested (Danner, 2005; Greenberg & Dratel, 2005) .
It is difficult to surmise whether the realist or liberal paradigm is more potent, given the international legal system's evident, though limited, ability to impose costs on lawbreaking. For the United States, this has involved how the U.S. public was indeed scandalized, albeit within limits, by Seymour Hersch's (2004) revelations about U.S. torture at Abu Ghraib, the unwillingness of France and Germany to join U.S. peacekeeping in Iraq, the inability of the United States to exclude certain U.N. Members States from the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and the inability of the United States to gain U.N. Security Council support for a variety of sanctions, among many examples attributable in part to U.S. violations of IHL (Byers, 2005) . However, one can agree with this observation but still feel as though the conclusion is weighted toward the proverbial glass half full instead of the glass half or more empty. The glass is at least half empty. The Bush administration, despite climbing down on a number of issues, has moved the bar after the fact down below the previous norm. This is the classic question of customary international law: Are new developments examples of lawmaking or lawbreaking, or some combination therein, which may or may not be describable? This raises the questions: What is power, and what is law? The problem evokes Justice Potter Stewart's dictum about pornography to the effect that "I cannot define it, but I know it when I see it" (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964) . At some point, power defines what is law because the powerful insist that a norm is legally binding, yet substantial interference by a powerful state with an established norm is a legal violation unless a state is so powerful in either hard of soft terms that it can retroactively persuade other states that the norm has autonomously changeddespite the fact that law is not supposed to apply retroactively (and even if the common law precedent system also so operates when judges make new legally binding precedents). This complicated situation means that it is very difficult to know what one is talking about in analyzing the power of international criminal law.
In the debate on what is law, international lawyers range from a spectrum ranging from no to full-enforcement capability. On one hand, Malcolm Shaw (2003) has maintained that enforcement must be irrelevant, lest any time a law is broken with impunity, the lawbreaker would be free to say that he has not violated a law. Most international law faculty tend to fall into this school or toward that end of the spectrum, arguing that the law is legally binding (putting aside the questions of what binding and legally binding mean). To insist that laws must be enforceable to exist would disqualify much of what international law has traditionally aspired to achieve. On the other hand, there are those who assert that international law requires enforcement and, in a more extreme form, the enforcement of states acting in a sovereign manner.
In the 1990s, there seems to have been a degree of "irrational exuberance" about the success and potential of international criminal law, particularly the emerging universal jurisdiction regime and the aggressive prosecutions underway (or anticipated) in national courts and international tribunals. This optimism has dissipated somewhat with the emergence of U.S. tendencies or efforts toward impunity from IHL. The U.S. approach is perhaps comparable to Michael Glennon's (2001) work on jus ad bellum (JAB) questions, where he maintains that the use of force rules may have been good law but are no longer, given the conflict between the law's words and states' actions. In any event, prior to 9/11, there was greater coherence and consistency about the JAB and the IHL regimes; since 9/11, there is more change and more academic interest in studying and questioning this change. There is also a broader academic question that should perhaps be (re)examined: Under what conditions do law and politics coincide (or not) toward JAB and IHL enforcement, and are these regimes now more (or less) legalized than previously? It would seem useful to focus on these specific issues because they are important in and of themselves and because they will cast light on broader questions concerning the relationship between politics and international law and between the interests, presumptions, and methods of international relations versus international law when dealing with such issues.
Before 9/11, there was a stark divide between realists focused on national security interests and idealists oriented toward legal development and implementation. Since 9/11, it seems that national security issues have received greater support from some idealists as well. This has generated considerable cynicism. And at the same time, some states and scholars have resisted efforts to subjugate JAB and IHL rules to national security concerns. It is clear that politics is intruding, but is it doing so in a categorically different way, or even more radically, have the various confluences and polarizations become so great that the regimes can now be declared either incoherent or unenforceable, or both?
In these circumstances, could we perhaps make midlevel hypotheses about law that cast it as neither binding de facto nor soft? Are the conditions for implementation present only when implementation is in the hegemon's interest? Does the definition of law needed to answer this question require an element of force and punishment, or can we speak only about norms as such? If Jack Goldsmith and John Yoo say the law is irrelevant and then write legal memoranda on torture (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005; Yoo, 2005) , or John Bolton says the United Nations is nonexistent and then agrees to be nominated as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, does this provide an epistemologically relevant insight into the dichotomy between what elites do and say about JAB, IHL, and related legal issues? To take another example, there is clearly a difference between the public rhetoric about preventive war and the foreign ministry to foreign ministry presentation of legal arguments (Byers, 2005) . In the latter arena, the United States and other governments tended to couch their arguments along more traditional lines, including avoiding unilaterally declared doctrines. Yet if the U.S. State Department is somewhat marginalized in bureaucratic politics, does this affect negatively these traditional lawmaking institutions and processes? Similarly, does the reduced influence of the career judge advocate generals on IHL issues change or challenge the traditional political-legal dynamic at the international level?
Perhaps these are classic debates that will never end. Much of the implicit assumptions of analysts depend on whether they consider norms to be binding because they are professed, on one hand, or whether one thinks they are norms that are legally binding only when strong states with the requisite capabilities choose to enforce them, or somewhere in between, where costs are imposed on violators, even if they can continue with impunity. It is possible that Shaw (2005) is correct that as the dictum goes, "hypocrisy is the respect which vice pays to virtue." 4 That is, even if one is a hypocrite, the person still may support the rule for society. It is presumably in the enlightened self-interest of powerful and weak states alike to mutually protect the rights of lawful combatants and protected persons. In practice, that long-term, enlightened self-interest is not always recognized in the shorter run. Through such reciprocity, IHL can safeguard and humanize armed conflict, both war and quasiwar, like the war on terrorism. Because "what goes around, comes around," powerful states often think twice before breaking IHL but also take a considerable political and increasingly even legal risks in violating it. What may be inconvenient obedience for more powerful states will be ignored in the short run when those powerful states perceive the short-term costs to be very high. Given the short-time horizon of many leaders in democracies, who cannot see much beyond the next election, the benefits of legal reciprocity often disappear from view among the elected leaders of the more powerful democratic states. In the U.S.-led counterinsurgency in Iraq, for example, the United States has ignored IHL in its detention and torture practices (and perhaps in perpetrating war crimes, particularly issues of discrimination and proportionality). Thus, there is neither a definable law of power nor a precise power of law when it comes to perceived national security conflicts with IHL.
U.S. respect for the rule of international law had become ambiguous, even a decade before the George W. Bush administration. Even for self-executing treaties or ones for which enabling legislation has been enacted, such as the Geneva Conventions or the Vienna Convention on Counselor Relations, U.S. officials and courts have ignored apparent international treaty obligations. For example, in April 1998, in the Breard case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the governor of Virginia executed a convicted murderer despite the plea of Secretary of State Madeline Albright that he obey an ICJ ruling for a stay, because the defendant did not receive his right under the Vienna Convention to counselor notification and possible advice from his Paraguayan embassy before and during his trial. The United States, in La Grange and Avena, has continued to ignore several more ICJ rulings to halt executions until trials with notification has occurred. Only in May 2005 did the U.S. Supreme Court remand a case on absent state notification to a foreign consulate for a capital indictment back to a state court for resolution, with the outcome there entirely unknown.
Following the post-9/11 pressures on the U.S. military to combat terrorism and improve intelligence gathering, U.S. public opinion appears less concerned about possible violations. Why has the United States refused to cooperate with the ICC even though it is a democracy, which Kant suggested should be more liberal and law abiding? Putnam's (1998) model of two-level games suggests that U.S. domestic politics might not be favorable to submitting to international jurisdiction, particularly when a relatively democratic public sees its national interest threatened by international cooperation (Evans, Jacobson, & Putnam, 1993) . Thus, the United States would support the ICTY because it assumes that U.S. officials and soldiers would not be subject to prosecution, which occurred even after the review of the 1999 war over Kosovo, and no NATO personnel were deemed liable. However, the ICC could hold U.S. officials and soldiers liable for crimes occurring in any State's Party's territory or if a U.S. cit-izen was arrested on the territory of same, or for its alleged cruel, inhume and degrading punishment of detainees.
Although the infamous Abu Ghraib prison photos will greatly damage any U.S. reputation for decency, Bush administration proposals to ignore IHL would be even worse. Violations of civil liberties include the post-9/11 roundup in the United States of illegal immigrants beyond the 7-day maximum detention without criminal or immigration charges authorized by the controversial USA Patriot Act. The U.S. Justice Department concluded that little or no efforts were made to distinguish detainees with ties to terrorism and those without (Jehl, 2005; Lewis, 2005) . Initial proposals by Defense Department and the White House lawyers for military commissions without many due process procedures were subsequently reversed by the George W. Bush administration. Attorneys for both the Justice Department and for the President agreed in an August 2002 memo that torture on suspected Al Qaeda detainees should, in principle, be acceptable if necessary to obtain information (Lewis, 2005) . Either the Vice President's counsel, David Addington, and/or for the President's, Alberto Gonzales, called some provisions of the Geneva Conventions "quaint" (Isikoff, 2004) . The American Civil Liberties Union disclosed a September 14, 2003, memo signed by Lt. General Ricardo A. Sanchez, then U.S. commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, that authorized 29 interrogation techniques, including 12 that "far exceeded limits established by the Army's own Field Manual" (www.aclu.org). At Guantánamo Bay, the United States classified most as "unlawful combatants" without the IHL protections for POWs for either, even though the Geneva Conventions require a tribunal to determine such a status if there is any doubt. In July 2004, following a court order, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to permit the Guantánamo detainees to challenge their detention there, based on U.S. incorporation of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, which covers prisioners of war and detainees. (At the time of writing, the U.S. Senate passed a bill reversing that court holding.) Allegations of IHL violations by the U.S. military have largely been investigated by the military itself, in effect, additionally as judge and executioner, rather than independent legal authority.
Of course, the United States has also opposed the ICC to the point where the United States was willing until June 2004 to stop all peacekeeping by the United Nations if U.S. soldiers were not immunized from ICC prosecution for IHL violations. Of course, the United States is under no obligation to participate in the ICC. However, these additional punitive actions suggest the lengths the United States is prepared to go to enforce its desire (Reisman, 2004) . The reason for not making bilateral immunity agreements universal among U.S. foreign aid recipients may be that sufficient protection had been achieved or the U.S. symbolic opposition had been clearly expressed (Cotton, 2005) . However, U.S. opposition to the ICC has also subsequently been somewhat reversed, from considering the ICC to be illegitimate to refusing to veto a U.N. Security Council resolution in early April 2005 authorizing the ICC to pursue cases involving the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, so long as no U.S. personnel there would be prosecuted.
U.S. indefinite detentions of unlawful combatants have been restricted, most notably in two cases of U.S. citizens by the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2004. Regarding the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was born in the United States but was raised in Saudi Arabia, the Supreme Court partly struck down his detention since late 2001, holding that enemy combatants, even if U.S. citizens, are entitled to use a lawyer to exercise their habeas corpus rights in court, even for suspected terrorists and unlawful combatants. The administration offered to deport him to Saudi Arabia and drop criminal charges if Hamdi would renounce his U.S. citi-zenship and promise not to travel to countries hosting suspected terrorists. After his case was dismissed in a Virginia district court, he was sent on October 11, 2004, to Saudi Arabia, despite the lack of assurances that his travels could be restricted by that government (Lewis, 2004) .
In late February 2005, following the June 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision to remand the case, a federal district judge ruled that another U.S. citizen detainee, José Padilla, also could not be indefinitely detained without filing criminal charges. The judge rejected the notion of the enemy combatant classification under constitutional or other U.S. law. As in the Schiavo "right to die" case 2 months later, a conservative judge held that to overturn due process procedures would amount to "judicial activism." The administration originally planned to appeal (Lewis, 2005) , but then decided to prosecute Padilla on criminal charges, but reserved the right to declare him an unlawful combatant again should Padilla be exonerated. However, the holding did not rely on IHL but on U.S. law reflecting it.
U.S. courts by mid-2005 had insisted that even supposedly, unlawful combatants were entitled to habeus corpus. As significantly, the courts had not, or had not had, the opportunity to challenge the responsibilities of senior U.S. officials for torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which is outlawed by IHL as well as several human rights treaties, especially the Torture Convention. Mistreatment of detainees overseas by the United States or its allies have hardly been investigated, let alone prosecuted as of mid-2005, although U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has claimed that there have been 200 prosecutions as of late 2005. In politics, the issue of torture was hardly discussed in the 2004 elections, although it has remained an important issue in the press. Concern for IHL and human rights violations have not disappeared, however, in an open society such as the United States; they are just competing for attention. IHL has been tested repeatedly for the ongoing relevance of its principles and rules. Even though many IHL principles on jus in bello on discrimination proportionality and necessity have not changed much since St. Augustin, some argue, paradoxically, that the rules can be bent because terrorists earlier had bent the rules-a contradiction apparently lost on these advocates. Others observe that if the customary laws of war are consistently broken, then they are no longer customary and binding. Appeals to Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention, which might purport to resolve such legal ambiguities on the side of humanitarian principles or action over realist imperatives, are ignored when states claim that their survival depend on it. The dubious claim that necessity requires obviating the need for IHL is nothing new-as George Orwell observed in Hommage to Catalonia and in any of the major or minor wars since that Spanish Civil War of the 1930s.
The alleged U.S. undermining of IHL includes indefinite detention and possible torture of suspected terrorists without counsel and their rendition to foreign interrogators of suspected terrorists, possibly for even harsher or less verifiable methods. Worse of all, the 2004 publications of the viscerally offensive Abu Ghraib photos, which showed cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment outlawed by the International Torture Convention, has to date produced no firings, resignations, or prosecutions of any senior U.S. official or military officer. Perhaps the most positive impact was the quiet renunciation of portions of a controversial White House 2002 legal memo that proposed ignoring most of the most important protections of detainees under the Third 1949 Geneva Convention and other relevant provisions of IHL. The photos prompted Sixty Minutes commentator Andy Rooney to declare wistfully that the day he saw the photos of sexual and bestial humiliation was as notorious as December 7, 1941 , and that he could no longer feel proud of his country, which had forfeited its reputation for decency.
It is too soon to assess the long-term impact of the Bush administration's resistance to IHL. The U.S. withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction from the ICJ during the 1986 Nicaragua case did not prove to be the death knell of that important court, even if it did introduce even more ambiguity in defining the norm of self-defense. IHL has evolved immensely since the mid-1990s from the statutes of the various international criminal tribunals and associated case law. Although not legally binding, the cases from the Hague and Arusha Tribunals and appellate court seem to have quickly been accepted by states as representing binding, customary international law. Dozens of convictions and arraignments of dozens of more indicted war criminals have induced immense optimism at the Hague ad hoc tribunal, following much despondency in the first decade that indictees would not be arrested or when they were, as in the Miloševic trial, the proceedings would be come too politicized. The case law has specified the application of the Hague and Geneva IHL rules, even if there remain hard cases, such as distinguishing avoidable and thus illegal collateral damage to protected property and persons. Although egregious atrocities can go unprosecuted because of the absence of witnesses and/or the political will, senior officials have been prosecuted for patterns of gross and systematic violations. Paradoxically, patterns of atrocities seem easier to prosecute than responsibility for individual crimes. Some wonder if there are not contradictory IHL principles, such as discrimination and proportionality. Despite these longstanding realities, there are assertions that the Geneva Conventions are no longer valid, "quaint," in the words of then Bush White House Legal Counsel Alberto Gonzales, or that violations represent an open challenge to the legitimacy of IHL. The most visible signs of IHL violations, such as the veritable pornography in published photos of the torture and abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, have generated more publicity than clarity over IHL norm definition and implementation. To integrate legitimate security concerns into IHL enforcement involves perceptions that IHL standards interfere with national security.
Scholarly Assessments of International Criminal Law
Recent books on emerging international criminal justice have underscored, sometimes unintentionally, just how much ambiguity remains in international criminal law and how much it is subject to endless debates. The events of 9/11 have led to the reassertion of sovereignty against international law. The remaining ambiguity over content and direction of the customary international law of armed conflict has also reduced its potency. Although judgemade law has clarified the binding treaty prohibitions against willful killing and torture as such, most situations of ill treatment have been made to appear not unlawful.
Books about IHL fall into two camps. One consists of analytic jurisprudence, explaining what the law is and assuming that it can and should be enforced (Shapiro, 1964) . The other, political jurisprudence, emphasizes the causes, functions, and consequences of legal institutions, typically courts, as part of an entire political system. In this latter approach, all relevant political factors must support the law for it to function, a reality that is even more important to international criminal law (Shapiro, 1964) . The former approach emphasizes de jure legal questions, whereas the latter focuses on de facto enforcement issues. With new criminal law specification and institutions, the two approaches can become blurred, although generally, law professors adopt the analytic approach and social scientists the political. In reality, customary law reflects a combination of the two, as the norms have to be accepted by states. In an environment of state hostility to international law, often only explicit treaty provisions are deemed binding. Although state power remains more important in determining what law is enforced, judges still enjoy some analytic autonomy.
Yet the range of IHL issues is so broad that systematic study of political as well as analytic jurisprudence is in order. Since 9/11, "hot" IHL topics have included the laws covering detainees, torture, prison conditions, tribunals, access of monitoring NGOs to zones of armed conflict and detention facilities, elements of war crimes, as well as both genocide and crimes against humanity, which theoretically can occur any time and place but almost always are restricted to war time. An interesting paradox is that the attention to this range of issues comes at a time, during the past 15 years, when war has become less frequent and less intense. Indeed, this may not be paradoxical given, contra Clausewitz (1989) , the growing resistance to war as an instrument of state policy (Easterbrook, 2005; Gurr & Marshall, 2003; Mueller, 2005) . Thus, the correlation of forces may be moving in the direction of greater humanitarianism in the law, following the Martens Clause, which has been incorporated into many IHL treaties, to err in the direction of law, not power. Still, unless journalists and scholars take note of the large majority of IHL violations, which go unnoticed, let alone prosecuted, we need to consider whether the prosecution strategy of IHL makes the most sense. For that purpose, scholars can do no better than to pay attention to the legal rubrics that were developed in depth prior to 9/11, when attention to the norm was not stressed by alleged new concerns.
The reason to consider some of these important, pre-9/11 books is that attention was paid primarily to the Martens Clause command, which states clearly that one should only deviate when there is any doubt on the law. By contrast, the U.S. positions developed by Professor Yoo and the Bush administration represent a radical departure from the very legitimacy of IHL itself.
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Summary of Five Books Under Review
This review essay considers five, pre-9/11 books that fall into another camp, clarifying the norms and enforcement international criminal law and rejecting the contention that such protections are inconsistent with security. They represent, in effect, the emerging consensus on IHL before President Bush asserted that "everything" had changed and his lawyers promulgated new practices and principles. Just as international lawyers often declared these new rules to be illegal, President Bush, in effect, asserted that new rules were required and being prepared. These also represent the view that these time-tested IHL principles should not change fundamentally in any type of armed conflict, even if particular rules can be modified, as they developed over the centuries and were judicially interpreted to respond politically to the crimes of the genocidal wars of the 1990s. The five books are an essential resource not only for assessing the state of IHL at the start of the New Millennium but also for evaluating the conflict between those who claim the U.S. war on terror and the Iraqi counterinsurgency is systematically violating IHL and the U.S. claim that it is creating new law to replace the anachronistic Geneva Conventions, which no longer constitute "good laws."
In the five books under review, we have both genres, although those advocating change would strengtehn, not weaken, IHL. Ronayne's analysis of the United States's reluctance to follow its commitments to halt genocide and Osiel's analysis of obedience to manifestly illegal orders presume legal obligations that need important political changes to achieve their objectives. Cigar and Williams, in presenting a legal brief against Miloševic for war crimes, presents a pure work of analytic jurisprudence. The Dormann et al. title is primarily a work of Carey / Review Essay on Evolving Laws 157 analytic jurisprudence in analyzing Article 8 of the ICC statute, although its reports of the preparatory commissions'review of the elements of crimes deeply integrates political factors in reporting the views of the states'parties on the provisions. Finally, the analysis of the ICTY statute, edited by Clark and Sann, combines both approaches in assessing the commission planning for the Hague tribunal and the likely political-legal outcomes. All these books, despite these varied methodologies, have common themes, which provide benchmarks for evaluating how much international criminal law has evolved since the early 1990s: the effectiveness of prosecution for justice and accountability, the responsibility to protect, and command and subordinate responsibilities.
Three of the five books reviewed here are early evaluations of two of the fundamental institutions: the ICTY and the ICC. The fourth investigates the inaction of the United States and the rest of the international community to three recent genocides. The final one, different in style, argues that mass murder can be inhibited by a much more robust regime proscribing obedience to "manifestly illegal orders," as the ICTY jurisprudence has been developed and as the ICC statute ostensibly does. The writers of these books, with their legalistic orientation, tend to minimize claims of military necessity. Yet even a reformer like Ronald Dworkin, who criticized the Bush administration's initial proposals for military commissions (Dworkin, 2002 (Dworkin, , 2003 , also acknowledged that some restrictions of civil liberties could, in principle, be made.
The five books all raise the issue of command and subordinate responsibility, both from the top for acts of subordinates and from the bottom in deciding whether to obey illegal orders. The books did not anticipate the increasingly aggressive U.S. response to terrorism that had been undertaken before 9/11 but attempt to "dumb down" standards or justify realist arguments.
Effectiveness of Prosecution
Law is supposed to focus on rules and deprive actors from political games and tricks or other forms of influence. In an ideal type, that may be true. Because of systems of plausible denial, the absence of written records and diaries, the reliance of verbal expressions of hatred and codes of silence, prosecution can be helpful to compel and coerce testimony or the threat of it in any amnesty-for-truth strategy. Circumstantial evidence has to be systematically compiled in addition to testimony at amnesty hearings to show that the lack of direct incriminating evidence does not make the case for denying the truth about mass murder. In practice, law's rules can be used in a politicized way, particularly when political leaders are under legal scrutiny and doubly so if there is a history of selective and anomalous prosecutions against a regime's opponents by regime protecting, policing, and/or prosecuting. For some, prosecutions based on the rule of law are only strict constructions of the law. For others, positivist rendering of the law is anachronistic and an often subtly biased imposition of outdated rules. The law should be construed reasonably, which means pursuing justice as most people understand it, even if consensus is not always possible.
Yet in war and its aftermath based on negotiated settlements, the typical pattern, perceptions of justice are most commonly divided and polarized. Thus, in perceiving trials, public expectations divide rather than unify because the societies in which the trials are held are usually persistently nationalist, politicized, and/or polarized about historical assumptions and facts and any trial that might try to rectify such misperceptions. Indeed, the very idea that trials could be designed to change views that one side was more just than the other is often bound to backfire.
Prosecution can be no panacea, even for the narrow goal of convicting the guilty. Many people lie under interrogation. Survivor testimony is usually the only type available, if any, and is fraught with the pain of recollecting details, eliciting nearly unbearable grief. Survivor testimony (and guilt) is rarely read or believed by communities allied with perpetrators. Given the problems for defendants of obtaining subpoenas and alibi witnesses, such communities view international prosecution cynically. Moreover, as Jose Alvarez (1998) has shown, one is more likely to stop impunity with local as opposed to international prosecutions (see also MacKinnon, 1998 Clark, a distinguished international criminal expert, and Sann, an editor of the journal, have done an admirable job anticipating key problems with the tribunal as well as recruiting authorities with the requisite foresight. The final chapter by Kenneth Gallant considers the challenge for the ICTY most cited in the press: the political and military difficulty in arresting indicted war criminals, despite legal requirements to extradite them under U.N. Security Council resolutions and Rule 29 of the ICTY statute. Yet many besides top Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic! and Ratko Mladic! have finally been arrested. Croatia still claims that another indicted general could not be located, even though its eligibility for admission to the European Union (EU) required the transfer of all Croatian indictees to the Hague. Clearly, the two political factors, the domestic opposition, and the incentives toward EU entry have produced significant, if incomplete, results. Less favorable circumstances in Serbia have protected more of their indictees from extradition, although it has followed Croatia's lead with increasing, if incomplete, cooperation to gain the status of candidacy for EU membership.
Without the unconditional surrender and ultimate capture, which atypically occurred to a high degree to Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany and currently in Iraq, voluntary extradition is required. Despite legal mandates, fugitive indictees are a frequent shortcoming of international prosecution. The difficulty of obtaining cooperation among various countries that periodically could have arrested these men, as well as the limited military intelligence capabilities to capture them, to say nothing of high cost, suggests that international prosecution, with extradition or arrest, is a risky as well as expensive endeavor to promote international peace and justice. Although the 2000 election in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) led to the removal of Miloševic! and a modest change of an "electoral authoritarian" regime to an electoral democracy (Diamond, 2002) , 6 Serb society generally has refused to accept the ICTY processes as revealing facts. In fact, to the extent that Miloševic! has been perceived in his ICTY trial as bolstering his reputation for defending the Serb nation against Western imperial domination and condescension, the ICTY has not developed a counternarrative in Serbia against war crimes.
In a more cautious essay in the Clark and Sann volume, David Forsythe raises the question of whether almost every combatant in lawless wars can be considered a war criminal. Should they all be tried and if so, how? The ICTR, for example, has only tried some of the leaders of the Rwandan government and other leading collaborators. The vast majority of collaborators are being "prosecuted" under gacaca customary courts.
7 This can lead to forgiveness granted for confessions. Although lawyers still worry about the lack of due process in this latter approach, the continued detention without charges of more than 130,000 alleged genocidal violators, often in inhumane conditions, is not consistent with international law either. Critics face a dilemma between impunity and unjust detention.
At the level of general responsibility for war crimes, denial is the characteristic temperament. Willful killing or murder or torture or the worst gratuitous barbarity dos not compel the IHL system into action. John Kerry noted on NBC-TV's Meet the Press in 2002 that in the Vietnam War, not only did he commit war crimes, but "everyone committed war crimes." Yet he argued that it has made no sense to prosecute them because it was the policy of the U.S. government. The reader can decide whether such a comment represents the words of an aspiring presidential candidate or a judicious formulation of prosecutorial discretion. What is clear is that as Forsythe argued, there are often wars where the entire approach is based on violating the laws of war, which reduces awareness and responsibility. New IHL institutions have responded with double standards, where only the weaker states are held to the putative international standard. Great powers find it rhetorically useful to blame and prosecute weak enemies but exempt themselves on the footing of legal sovereignty or reasons of state.
Knut Dormann and his collaborators, in Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the ICC: Sources and Commentary, provide a most systematic analysis of the current
understanding of what each of the war crimes in Article 8 of the Rome statute mean. The main contributor, Dormann, is a legal adviser to the legal division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). His two collaborators are also prestigious, Doswald-Beck, the secretary-general of the International Commission of Jurists, and Robert Kolb, head of teaching at the University Institute of Higher Studies in Geneva. The summaries of the legislative history (travaux préparatoires) are worth the price of this essential reference. Its only shortcoming, in this single volume of 500 pages, is that it does not review scholarly analyses of law journal debates. But it thoroughly presents the legislative history and understandings of the various Preparatory Commissions, as well as relevant case law. In the final Preparatory Commission prior to establishing the elements of crimes, the ICRC presented most of this volume for their consideration and approval. Thus, the book is both a reference guide and a historical document. As a systematic presentation of what the ICRC believes the war crimes in the Rome statute mean, the volume is worthwhile. No other NGO has the equivalent status as a subject of international law as the ICRC and has its expertise and experience. This is, of course, not to suggest that the ICRC is above criticism, but rather, its views can represent a benchmark from which states should justify their actions that deviate from these norms. In addition, the book will contribute greatly to the clarification and development of both the interpretation of the Rome statute's war crimes' meaning under customary international law at this stage, prior to litigation at the ICC, as well as provide insights into areas of law, given the ambiguity and numerous issues emerging in the first state discussions about the ICC statute's Article 8.
Article 8 (2)(c)(i) of the ICC statute, for example, prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture." This clause is treated in 10 pages in the book as well as in other sections concerning more general discussions of definitions and legal contexts. This volume's ICRC commentary asserts that the perpetrator must be aware that the person killed was a civilian or an exempted soldier outside of combat or medical or religious personnel. This raises the question of whether the perpetrator should have known and had a duty of care to know. Even if a reasonable attempt was made to find out, many battlefield situations, particularly when combatants do not wear uniforms, are ambiguous. Even less explicit are the terms for the war crime of cruel treatment, which sounds like a tautology. Not only does this raise the issue of factual knowledge, but it also raises the problématique of what constitutes "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." The authors comment that it can be understood as "inhuman treatment" or "cruel treatment." The only additional criterion or example offered is a "serious attack on human dignity" offered by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic and Others and by noting that inhuman treatment, unlike torture, does not have to be "purposive," which presumably means intentional. On the other hand, the commentary cites the Tadic case, where the standard was provided in more positive terms, citing Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which asserts that "persons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely without any adverse distinction." This meant, according to the Court, that corporal punishment is not the only form of cruel treatment and "that no narrow or special meaning is here being given to the phrase 'cruel treatment'" (p. 400). This standard, which permits mental suffering as cruel and inhuman, however, does not go as far as the Martens Clause of the Hague Conventions, which leaves the process of interpretation of ambiguous clauses to the standards and interests of civilized behavior. That is, the benefit of the doubt would also require prohibiting degrading behavior toward human beings.
According to the Furundzija judgment, torture, like inhuman treatment, consists of "severe pain or suffering whether or physical or mental" but is different (and worse) because it must be intentional as an official or agent of a warring state trying to obtain information. Although this definition leaves open the question of what constitutes severe pain and suffering, the additional criteria limit the scope of application of this more heinous war crime.
Arguably, this book represents the best synthesis of existing laws on the crimes of war that exist. It is the counterpart reference work for legal experts to Roy Gutman and David Rieff's (1990) Crimes of War, which is addressed to the lay reader, as well as the recently published opus by the ICRC, Customary IHL (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005 Bartov (2002) calls an "intoxicating illusion." Bystanders are also morally guilty, if legally innocent, for tolerating crimes about which they are aware or should be aware. They too are in denial, an "innocent denial," as Charny (2000) calls it as part of his two-dimensional typology of genocide denial: the extent of conscious awareness that a genocide occurred and the extent that the individual concerned would take conscious pleasure in the sufferings of the intended victims if she or he did know about them. This model carefully differentiates different psychological reactions to genocide in countries that tolerated mass murder. It could offer the basis for thinking about four types of reactions to genocide or crimes against humanity: (a) malevolent denial among the perpetrators who see nothing wrong with what they do; and three types of innocent denial among the general population, including (b) those who do not know about the war crimes, but who would be horrified, but are too fearful to try to find out; (c) those who do not know about the war crimes but who would be pleased by the war crimes and do not try to find out because they realize the propaganda value of keeping them secret; and (d) those who know about the war crimes and are horrified but cannot motivate themselves to complain, perhaps out of fear. Clearly, prosecution is usually only feasible in malevolent denial cases. However, the dilemma posed by malevolent denial is that it may decrease innocent denial, particularly among those in Type C, those who would take pleasure in war crimes even if they were unknown.
All the books under review explicitly or implicitly advocate prosecution. The question remains whether prosecution deters by threatening perpetrators and shaming innocent deniers or whether it merely strengthens their resolve to deny the crimes. Sometimes, a society so hates the victims and their society that they cannot come to terms with what their own society has perpetrated. This denial of the past creates a culture of denial about the present. The counterargument is that silence is a relative peace, the lesser of two evils, that could also turn into a good thing if the warring societies can avoid war. It may only solve the symptoms of mass murder but not the hatred that causes it. Solving the symptoms, however, not only saves lives but might also under some circumstances gradually induce ethnic tolerance. To insist on the truth, including insisting on the prosecution of perpetrators, may only reinforce another cause of mass murder: the perceived sense of group victimization. This counterargument to prosecution is reinforced, finally, by the reality that inducing shame only works with individuals and groups that have a sense of shame. To insist on a formula that worked for Germany and arguably less so for Japan is ethnocentric.
None of the books under review consider truth commissions and other alternatives to prosecution. Furthermore, there is little or no discussion of the discretion that prosecutors have on whether to pursue prosecution on any political basis as opposed to the amount of evidence available. The assumption is that prosecution, where feasible, is always desirable. International lawyers and human rights activists often argue for mandatory prosecutions, including during regime transitions, whereas diplomats and pragmatists insist on amnesty to facilitate peaceful change (Baker, 1996) . There is debate about the role of transitional justice, where pragmatists and participants argue that prosecution, although theoretically desirable, is not often possible and can be quite counterproductive. A negotiated peace or regime transition, which is difficult enough to achieve, may necessitate amnesties even for violent human rights violators represented in negotiations with an outgoing regime. Critiques of prosecution also include the difficulty and expense of assuring a fair trial; achieving convictions, based on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and reporting on the trial in an open media as well as perceptions of imperialism and bias under foreign supervision of or direct prosecutions and the few numbers of the guilty who could possibly be convicted by either domestic or international trials.
The debate over prosecution deserves an empirical test. Many books have been written about Nuremberg. Few studies of the relationship between prosecution, collective memory, and innocent and malevolent denial exist. In an earlier book, Osiel (1997) writes that under effective trial conditions, without distractions or loss of due process, a traumatized society that is deeply divided about its recent past can greatly benefit from the collective representations of that past, created and cultivated by a process of prosecution and judgment, accompanied by public discussion about the trial and its result. (p. 39) However, Osiel also provides a cautionary tale. He warns that any courtroom histrionics may reinforce denial at the level of both perpetrator and society. Beyond prompting value commitments for the community through criminal justice, trials are also employed for political motives, such as consolidating public sentiments for honorably didactic or disreputably vengeful purposes.
The 13-month trial in Stuttgart, Germany, during 1991 to 1992 of the octogenarian Josef Schwammberger, for example, illustrates how difficult such trials can be even when a relatively penitent Germany is involved. A low-ranking, Austrian SS (Schutzstaffel/Protective Force) officer in charge of rounding up Jews in Galicia, Poland, was arrested for running three slave labor camps, gathering Jews from ghettos, murdering 25 Jews with his own hand, and being an accomplice in at least 641 additional murders.
8 Then Argentinean President Carlos Ménem extradited him to Germany even though he had previously pardoned several of his generals who had been courageously prosecuted by his predecessor, Raul Alfonsín, 9 for 30,000 disappearances and illegal adoptions of children of the victims in the late 1970s.
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Even in Germany, given the distracting difficulties of German reunification, along with perceived Holocaust fatigue, some Germans did not want to be reminded again to be penitent.
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Still, without his prior confession and 100-plus witnesses, Schwammberger's claim that he simply could not remember committing the charges might have succeeded. After the oblivion defense clearly was failing, Schwammberger's attorneys resorted to denying the Holocaust (Freiwald & Mendelson, 1994) . The Schwammberger trial, thus, involved Holocaust history, the struggle between the will to remember and the will to forget, as well as the direct drama between victims and defendant. The German government went through the legal and remembering processes. More frequently, governments take the Ménem amnesia approach of looking to the future and trying to forget the past. Or there may be a dearth of witnesses without detailed, Nazi-type documents, with atrocities committed by all sides, and where prosecutorial functions are heavily influenced by politics, or perceived as such. Even under the best circumstances like Schwammberger, prosecution does not make subtle distinctions beyond guilty and not guilty in judging history. Courts rarely try individuals for "innocent denial" of knowledge of crimes that they willfully ignored, only for failure to stop or report a crime (Charny, 1982 (Charny, , 2000 . Most vexing, the demand for prosecution to prevent impunity, advocated by many international lawyers, might be divisive and can even inspire violence in polarized settings. The success of the South African Truth and Reconciliation model, with limited amnesty offered for testimony, induces less impunity as general amnesties imposed from above by outgoing administrations. When political circumstances generate amnesties as a legal bargaining chip, powerful forces can intimidate judicial processes from proceeding.
A more reserved critique has been taken by Paul van Zyl, former executive-secretary of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He opposes criminalizing justice at the international level. He argues, in focusing on transitional justice, that prosecution imposes too many irresolvable issues. Van Zyl assumes that justice, particularly in the underresourced developing world, involves more than just expensive and difficult criminal trials if they could be held successfully, a dubious proposition. In the worldwide embrace of a "globalized justice," with international courts, universal jurisdiction, international arrest warrants, and Carey / Review Essay on Evolving Laws 163 extradition requests, the result is a "justiciable globalization" with many of the negative consequences for justice that opponents of economic globalization fear. This ethnocentric conception of justice favors prosecution over truth commissions, reparations, and/or forgiveness, with institutions derived from countries with much higher (if declining) confidence in their courts than enjoyed in most countries. In an address, van Zyl (1999) asked, What type of justice are we talking about? Is it a narrow kind of justice which equates justice with prosecution? Or, is it a broader, or more inclusive kind of justice, which says that justice entails prosecution, truth for both victims and perpetrators, some measure of reparation, some measure of institutional reform, and some attempt to promote reconciliation? Is our conception of justice driving the institutions we are establishing in order to enforce it? Do we rely on courts because they are the most effective institutional measures to promote justice? Or, do we rely on them because they are familiar, because of a lack of imagination by lawyers, because the other conception of justice is too amorphous and too difficult to define?
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Criminal courts are not instituted to manage individuals and mass responses to evil in the same way a mental health recovery might be. Ordinarily, criminal trials are for dispute resolution, punishment of the convicted, deterrence of violence, protection of society, and rehabilitation of defendants. Rarely have theorists considered rehabilitation of communities-until the emergence of the prevailing IHL optimism in the mid-1990s until 9/11. Courts can establish beyond all reasonable doubt what happened to loved ones and a nation and perhaps induce shame among those who value honesty and decency. Trials have less or no control over civil society's group dynamics and socialization through media and education and the cultures in which these occur.
There would seem to be at least three crucial tests to address when considering the advisability and effects of prosecution on denial syndromes. The first is whether free and fair trials can be held either domestically or under international jurisdiction. The second is whether those trials are likely to be seen as politically motivated. A fair trial's mitigation of denial syndromes is not sufficient without public acknowledgment from the press and public officials that the crimes cited in the trial did indeed occur. Finally, even if a fair trial can be held that will not be reinterpreted as a political trial, the final test is whether the domestic or foreign trial can adduce sufficient evidence to achieve a conviction. If the reality is that unfree trials are common, or adducing sufficient, persuasive evidence is equally difficult, then prosecution, as van Zyl argues, is neither panacea nor wise.
Combating Denial Syndromes
Of course, the minimal goals of punishing and deterring genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity can sometimes justify trials. It is presumed that when trials are not held, cycles of violence can be repeated, though such trials are very much the historical exception. Would the two Balkan Wars in the early part of the 20th century and the genocides that occurred during World War II not have occurred had there been earlier trials? It is plausible that a new regime might ignore the reality of earlier convictions. Denial is also an inhibitor of democratization, just as free, open societies are inhibitors of denial. Democracies, however, are not built in a day. Many tasks face builders of consolidated, democratic institutions, and societal values are also needed for open debate to inhibit denial of the truth. Specific institu-tions in addition to trials can help open societies, including reparations, truth commissions, and university research.
If it has become too late to stop a regime's crimes, then the next task is to discourage impunity by combating denial with the facts adduced through education, journalism, scholarship, and if possible, prosecution. However, education can be more powerful if honest about the crimes perpetrated. In partly or fully "closed societies," where the state monopolizes or dominates mass media, creating an "audiovisual authoritarianism," the public will not learn of any pertinent facts under the distortion of official propaganda. If there are more pluralistic sources of opinions, then other political conditions need to be congruent. Less effective is a postwar military stalemate where most of the grievances that led to war remain unresolved and both sides threaten each other. The more treacherous types of Nazi crimes, combined with unconditional surrender, are the most inductive to critical, self-examination, shame, and confession, reducing the likelihood of denial syndromes.
It becomes evident that many factors come into play in helping to perpetuate denial. These include the international climate in the period following the atrocities (and the role of thirdparty states); the reaction of a state to the prosecution of its nationals for crimes against humanity and the reaction of the same state to the international climate, both which entail nationalism; and last, the effectiveness of the trials themselves. It is discovered that the role of third parties in obstructing prosecution of the perpetrators of crimes of humanity and genocide leads to a lack of resolution for a perpetrator state that lends itself easily to denial. The perpetrators are granted impunity by third-party states in a number of ways and for a number of reasons, most of which can be lumped into a category and labeled self-interest. Nationalism is largely a reaction to justice imposed by victors, as well as miscarriage of justice that creates an "us" and "them" phenomenon that feeds into the ability of a state and its people to be in denial. Last, the effectiveness of the trials themselves can become grounds for denial in that the number of guilty prosecuted without scrupulous due process can delegitimate the trials and their verdicts. If the perpetrators rarely offered due process to its victimizers and victims, denial also involves overlooking the regime's own lack of fairness. In this way, denial is difficult to prevent.
The world of great powers ignored one of the worst incidences of mass murder, in relative terms, since World War II, the 1994 Rwanda genocide with deliberate denial, neither just an innocent nor malevolent denial. Incapacitated by the sudden 1993 withdrawal from the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, it took almost 5 years after the specter of Rwanda before collective action to prevent genocide was again undertaken in March 1999 in Kosovo. Meanwhile, mass murder, genocide, has been occurring outside the West in Sudan, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Darfur. Since the 1994 "Third Genocide," (Destexhe, 1994 (Destexhe, -1995 , the world seems to have been in denial that Rwanda has been led since by a Tutsi regime that committed mass murder in the Eastern Congo.
In terms of combating malevolent denial, Deborah E. Lipstadt, the historian-defendant exonerated by Justice Grey on April 12, 2000, of libeling David Irving in her book Denying the Holocaust, asserted that she was not tough enough on Irving's malevolent denial that Jews and Roma were massacred. The danger of lies about genocide remains:
More people in the United States . . . believe that Elvis Presley is alive and well than believe that the Holocaust didn't happen. . . . Holocaust-denial is not a clear and present danger, as long as there are survivors around, as long as there are people around who say, 'this is what happened to In terms of combating innocent denial, Jan Gross has concluded that the Poles need to examine their amnesia for their lack of circumspection about Polish anti-Semitism and for many taking pleasure in Hitler's "solving the Jewish problem." Although, some Poles did protect Jews, and others watched massacres with indifference, only speaking out to identify Jews trying to escape, and some even perpetrated the murders (Gross, 1979) . What difference would trials make? The record is unclear. Japan is said to maintain its no longer, innocent mass denial of World War II crimes, despite the Tokyo war crimes trials. In other countries without trials, there has been recidivism of a kind. In Turkey, repression against the Kurds in the southeast of the country has continued. Romania perpetrated the abject deaths of the early phases of communism both in Securitate prisons and in the deportation and subsequent deaths on the Danube Delta canal project, which killed more than 100,000. In France, there was the killing of noncombatant civilians in Algeria and Vietnam. (Indeed, on V-E day itself, May 8, 1945, against colonialism.) For Pakistan, the dirty war in Kashmir continues to this day.
Responsibility to Protect
Part and parcel of contemporary conceptions of international efforts is the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, led by the former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, propounded and many commentators have embraced, including U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan (Day & Freeman, 2005; U.N. Secretary General, 2004 However, Never Again deserves a broad reading because it is equally accessible and insightful, if less comprehensive. Written in the same epoch as Power but without the autobiographical additions, his book analyzes the three recent genocides in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Although Ronayne suggests that his book is not particularly theoretical, his eclectic use of realism and constructivism is more theoretical than Power's approach. He considers an argument that Power does not address: the U.S. policy change advocating prosecution, at least in the two ad hoc tribunals, at the same time as the United States, as Power also emphasizes, avoids direct intervention other than humanitarian assistance. For Power, the greatest of her frustrations with U.S. policy is U.S. inaction. Ronayne, a senior faculty member of the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia, wants the United States to do more, to realize "never again" in the world, because he agrees with the observation that the United States is the most powerful state since the Roman Empire. Sympathetic to the Kenneth Thompson/Hans Morgenthau approach to morality in foreign policy, his humanitarian support is conditional on the realist imperative that U.S. national interests are simultaneously served. Thus, we have a dilemma: Stopping genocide must also serve U.S. core national interests.
Ronayne supports greater education of the public that stopping genocide is in the U.S. national interest. The difficulty, of course, as he and Power have shown, is convincing the public that it has stakes in stopping instances of foreign mass murder. However, Ronayne is more optimistic than Power, suggesting that U.S. domestic politics can overcome realist and/ or isolationist imperatives in U.S. foreign policy, which often discourage U.S. engagement in mass sufferings by defining national interest in an enlightened way: "It is a realistic hope and vision of an ethically progressive policy" (p. 208). He tempers this statement by advocating incremental and piecemeal approaches to preventing and suppressing genocide, suggesting the necessity of seizing "ethical leadership moments." His acceptance of constructivism suggests that under certain circumstances, domestic groups can identify U.S. foreign policy actions with its self-identity of being a force for good and a resistor of evil in the world.
Maintaining an altruistic state identity can be difficult, given other realist dynamics and incentives. For example, U.S. policy neglected all three of the genocides in his book. However, strategic interests were usually unimportant in these cases, although in Cambodia, the United States supported the deposed, genocidal, Khmer Rouge regime because the proSoviet Vietnamese army conduced the humanitarian intervention to stop it (and thereby also enhance Vietnam's own security).
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In the Clark and Sann volume, Cherif Bassiouni, reporting on the work of a group of experts investigating IHL violations in the former Yugoslavia, as a precursor to establishing the ICTY, reports that the experts concluded that the word group in the Genocide Convention should be interpreted broadly. Not only would "national, racial, religious, or ethnical" groups be included but also regionally based ones. Thus, the Siege of Sarajevo was the setting not only for war crimes but also genocide. The definition adopted by the drafters of the 1948 Genocide Convention retained a relatively narrow conception of protected groups but rejected the broad scope of the acts of genocide that Raphael Lemkin had originally contemplated. The original definition of genocide developed and proposed by Lemkin in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe also included among genocidal acts those attempted to destroy the culture and livelihood of the group (attacks on political groups do not constitute genocide). The ICTY uses the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention. The genocide covered by the ICTY and ICTR easily fits the Convention's definition of genocide. However, the ICC, covering the entire world, will be more limited by the narrower definition of genocide.
Command and Subordinate Responsibilities
The element of command responsibility is found in several places in the ICC statute, such as Article 33. How it applies in practice, except in the most egregious examples of provable crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide is unclear. Norman Cigar and Paul Williams's Indictment at the Hague: The Miloševic! Regime and Crimes of the Balkans War synthesizes evidence for indictments against Serb President Slobodan Miloševic! and others before the former's trial began, mostly for the period of the early 1990s in Bosnia and surrounding areas. Its logic is simple: Miloševic! had command responsibility for Serb official and irregular forces outside of Serbia who committed war crimes because he must have had actual knowledge that subordinates were conspiring to commit war crimes. Furthermore, he failed to punish anyone directly involved after the crimes occurred. Indeed, his denial was so complete that he never admitted any crimes were ever committed. In particular, as Cigar and Williams argue, Carey / Review Essay on Evolving Laws 167 stances of manifestly illegal orders. Osiel inspires us to wonder what percentage of such orders are so clear. He contends that U.S. military law should emulate the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as the ICTY, that obedience to illegal orders should be considered only as a factor in mitigating punishment and not for establishing guilt or innocence. His main claim is that soldiers that only obey legal orders fight more effectively is a hypothesis that deserves more study and reflection.
One problem is that the Nuremberg and ICTY contexts have largely concerned such blatantly illegal orders. Situations of contestable or ambiguous illegality characterize many, perhaps most, combat, and oftentimes, disagreements exist in good faith. Osiel persuasively shows that most courts, whether the Nuremberg standard is theoretically accepted, in practice are very lenient. Furthermore, because disobedience in combat is virtually likely to result in punishment if not banishment from the military, or even death, the amount of courage expected of soldiers to disobey illegal orders may be unrealistic.
Osiel's contribution, rooted in theories of culture, socialization, and critical theory, is to argue for a new hegemony about what militaries can teach about the legality of orders. He argues readers that atrocities result from racial hatred, militarism, and nationalism on one hand and counterinsurgency tactics and the desire for reprisals on the other. Most militaries can reduce the former tendencies such as nationalism even if their military cultures are subjected to more democratic, less nationalist control from civilians. In many states, democracies included, this is unrealistic. However, democratic and authoritarian armies commit war crimes during counterinsurgencies because the enemy often hides among civilians and conducts ambushes. Still Osiel dispels the notion that atrocities result from innate primordial passions. He is persuasive in showing how modern, hierarchical armies can become more prone to civilian control, which in turn demands respect for IHL. Instead, he argues, following the argument of Janowitz (1977) rather than Huntington (1968) , that military intervention in society and politics more often reflects internal military dynamic than societal ones. The most important internal military reform, Osiel contends, is to prosecute subordinates for obeying manifestly illegal orders as well as those who commanded them. If subordinates were taught to make independent decisions, Osiel contends, they would both fight more intelligently and appropriately question prima facie illegal orders and disobey those that fail the test of legality.
The sources for Osiel's argument are eclectic. He disavows philosophical approaches that attempt to fit into any particular paradigm that fails to respond appropriately to important moral challenges. He uses both Kantian and pragmatic approaches, among others, and eschews utilitarianism because it omits minimum rights (see contrasting views of Dershowitz, 2004; Dorfman, 2004; Ignatieff, 2004) . Protecting the rights of the most vulnerable is the essence of the laws of war.
Osiel does not entertain whether to ever condone torture, but he does examine another controversial moral dilemma in detail: reprisals. Unlike the Geneva Conventions, the earlier Hague Conventions do permit reprisals if they are intended to be used narrowly and do have an intended deterrent effect. He cautiously prefers the Hague over the Geneva standard, even though orthodox, analytic jurisprudence would accept the more recent set (Geneva) of treaties. As with torture, reprisals represent a moral quandary because of the possibly perverse incentives, which could produce more violence instead of deterring violence, as intended. Osiel claims to seek Kantian ethics, which ordinarily do not permit exceptions. Yet Osiel would accept the legality of reprisals when they do deter. Similarly, subordinate discretion could increase the rate of war crimes committed. Until states' domestic military codes criminalize due obedience to manifestly illegal orders, subordinates will not be willing to disobey the newly clarified IHL standards from case law. Now that the ICTY has punished a defendant for due obedience to summary execution (in a firing squad), albeit with a reduced sentence from 10 to 5 years on appeal, for executing in a firing squad, lest he be summarily executed too, there is at least a chance that in future wars, those ordered to commit atrocities will resist. The Nazis reportedly, however, did not punish anyone for refusing to execute detainees (Goldhagen, 1996) . Perhaps despite the threat to this defendant, the Bosnian Serb army might not have done so as well. It is a moral position, whether in combat or with detainees, few civilian observers can easily appreciate. Still, we must continue to debate such questions.
Similarly, Osiel argues against either a legalism or realism paradigm in developing military norms. The essence of Osiel's argument is if the law appeals to a positive view of human nature, the law can induce soldiers to distinguish illegal from legal orders and disobey the former. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence adduced, as Osiel, despite his sociological training, is really a philosopher. Although Stalin was not interested in legality, his realist view that fear is the greatest motivator is probably a more accurate predictor of how soldiers actually behave under stress. Osiel's book is so significant because he convincingly offers an answer to one of the most significant areas of unresolved legal controversy addressed among all five books.
Conclusion
These books therefore, minimize how IHL is influenced by realism and geopolitics. States tend to use international law selectively and opportunistically, as suggested by the paradigm of political jurisprudence. NGOs, lawyers, and liberals, in pursuit of international cooperation, find the paradigm of analytic jurisprudence more propitious in promoting the optimism of late 1990s that states would cooperate and make IHL enforceable. Short-term change in the 1990s is not a reliable indicator of structural change that may have occurred since September 11, 2001 . The progress in the law of armed conflict may not survive the attempts of the Bush administration to marginalize transnational legal processes.
Reading these books is helpful in assessing both what has been admonished and ignored and what was completely overlooked in planning these international criminal institutions. As desirable as are these new rules, and rulings, these authors of these quite admirable works still did not foresee many consequences, positive and negative. Why should that be?
First, the authors were more clairvoyant on the legal issues than the political, which are more difficult to anticipate and are either more important or at least trump legal (or economic) matters where these concerns intersect. For example, they initially did not anticipate the difficulty in arresting war criminals, then exaggerated the difficulty in later studies only to find after the first decade of the ad hoc tribunal for Yugoslavia that arrests became more politically feasible (though several very significant, indicted war criminals are still at large).
Second, the authors all seem to assume that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg should be a model for contemporary international prosecution because the Nuremberg trials helped shame most Germans for having supported the Nazi regime and for implicitly denying to themselves that the regime was perpetrating atrocities of the worst sort against Jews, Gypsies, mentally handicapped, political opponents, and others. The authors appear to forget that one-sided prosecutions ("victor's justice") were essential to this model. Aside from any moral considerations of fairness, such prosecutions generally require a disparity of power, which ordinarily does not exist in either the typical stalemates at the end of wars unless there are outside powers with an interest in the region. The Nuremberg model is also one where defendants were chosen as much by military and civilian, sectoral representivity, and individual availability rather than according to how egregious were their crimes (Sands, 2003) . Furthermore, the international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda were instituted in part because of the Western failure to stop these genocides when appropriate force could have either prevented or limited the extent of genocide.
14 Furthermore, Nuremberg was unique because of the rare preponderance of archival evidence. Even more important than the trials was the change in attitude of the German population against the Nazi regime just after the latter's defeat, as well as the relatively positive reception granted to Western occupation troops, along with the generous Marshall Plan. The contrast with Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq is clear. Even with this Nuremberg precedent and the subsequent Geneva Conventions, more than 100 million people have been killed since the Nuremberg trials, and there is a diminishing constituency in politics and society for conducting humanitarian interventions to stop mass murder, despite the progress of the 1990s in that regard.
Third, the five books specify criteria for a free and fair trial. That some societies will deem trials based on due process as politicized can have as negative effects as politically motivated trials can have. Many trials of those responsible for mass murder and other heinous crimes generally are going to be perceived as political. Rare are the conditions in which it remains advisable to proceed with expensive, long, and possibly perceived politically motivated trials of major leaders. The emphasis on concrete rules over processes of conflict resolution by third-party settlement does not capture the actual politicization of legal enforcement (Byers, 2000; Carey, 2002; Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, & Slaughter, 2001) . IHL courts may be seen as illegitimate for wars without an unconditional surrender, as most wars do. Unlike in Iraq, with one-sided "victor's justice" perceived, a defendant's country often feels no shame for the crimes committed in their name while nationalists, veterans, and citizens feel persecuted by international prosecution. Even when relatively safe, witnesses will often not want to testify because of the pain, inconvenience, and guilt felt by survivors of atrocities and genocide. Prosecutions by countries are also expensive, competing with other postwar or transitionrelated priorities.
There are two concurrent trends reflecting both more cooperation in some spheres and more confrontation and indeterminate legal evolution in others: greater judicialization and law clarification in some areas and greater law evolution and uncertainty in other areas. IHL should be applied to the powerful as well as to weak states or nonstate actors. Nothing is likely to encourage terrorism generally and Islamo-fascism and suicidal terrorism as IHL violations by the powerful. Movement toward the prosecution alternative needs to be developed, even if impractical in some contexts.
These five books fail to acknowledge that prosecution is a high-risk, high-return proposition. For example, the enormous investment placed in the Lockerbie trial's successful guilty conviction in late January 2001 of one of the two Libyan defendants in the Hague, under Scottish criminal law, would be very difficult to replicate. The largely circumstantial case left many legal observers wondering how such flimsy evidence could have convinced the judges of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The ensuing denial syndrome in Libya, with celebrations for the "victory," is an indication of how little denial syndromes are reducible in states spon-soring this terrorism. In fact, the 2004 reversal of Libyan foreign policy promoting terrorism seems to have resulted more from the opportunity to end more than a decade of U.N. Security Council economic sanctions and intimidation from the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and had no effect on denial of terrorism.
If prosecutions are going to go forward, the international community needs to monitor them. Effective and legally correct criminal justice institutionalization will be a long and difficult project. The reliance on international tribunals, both ad hoc and the ICC, will initially induce nationalist backlashes, which may reinforce denial syndromes before younger generations recognize the facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Denial will not often work if the guilty country is expected to grovel in shame in front of the more powerful and hypocritical West. Given the difficulty of arresting indicted war criminals with force, it may not be possible to prosecute those responsible for mass murder, even where there is a desire and the resources. Thus, other approaches to offsetting denial syndromes other than "prosecution as panacea" will have to be devised. These include amnesties, truth commissions, education campaigns, and democratic conditioning of foreign aid toward improved democratization, as has proven so successful among NATO and the EU candidate countries from the former Soviet Union. These approaches should replace top-down, international approaches with partnerships with local authorities to engender legitimacy and pertinent solutions.
Given that the literature has generally underestimated many of these risks and assumed that prosecution impunity should be fought at all costs, attention should focus on what practical experience has taught about prosecuting even the most egregious violations. There are conceptions of justice that are consistent with universal human rights, which might allow for more discretion not to prosecute IHL violations and genocide when other alternatives are present. Not only is the relatively unique model of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission worthy of consideration, along with negotiated, limited amnesties, it might also be possible to conceive of international truth commissions being established instead of international prosecutions. Diamond's (2002) count, between a quarter and a third of all states are "electoral authoritarian" (p. 27).
Notes
By Larry
7. According to Joann Fisher (2005) , Inkiko ("jurisdiction") Gacaca combines aspects of traditional Gacaca with a more formal, hierarchical system of justice imported through colonialization. The community is called together to elect judges from the community (denominated nyangamugayo), who facilitate a process of reconstruction of the events of 1990 to 1994. The community agrees on a census of those present at the time of the genocide, then of victims and damage. They proceed house by house, with the community called on as witnesses of the inventoried killing, rape, and property damage. The accused are tried and subject to a combination of punitive and reparative justice.
8. The mayor of Stutgaart, Manfred Romel, the son of the general who tore up Hitler's orders to commit summary executions, noted that he felt the trial was important and must happen: "But I look forward to the day when biology runs its course and we will not have to do this again" (Freiwald & Mendelson, 1994. 9. President Mènem also faced an even more complicated choice several years later on the Italian extradition request for Erich Priebke, whose Argentine citizenship had to be revoked.
10. For results of the remarkable trials of Argentinean generals, see "Argentina: National Appeals Court (Criminal Division) Judgment on Human Rights Violations by Former Military Leaders" (1987) and the analysis of President Alfonsín's legal advisor and others, in Malamud-Goti and Malamud (1986) .
11. Four German prosecutors had information on Schwammberger's whereabouts in Argentina since the 1950s, but the first petition for extradition for Schwammberger arrived in 1972 and was ignored by the democratic Argentinean government not only then but also until his October 1987 arrest (Freiwald & Mendelson, 1994 ). Menem's "due obedience law," defying the Common Article Three of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on internal wars, made legitimate the effective amnesty of all ranks from colonel downward. Thus, even in the exceptional case of Argentina, most of those responsible were never prosecuted, although they were often identified in the Nunca Más truth commission report (Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared, 1986). Because illegal adoptions were not amnestied, some officers may be prosecuted for that offense.
12. Complimentarity refers to the right to prosecute domestic courts before an International Criminal Courts except where the domestic court is unwilling or unable. This differs from the two ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which both have primary jurisdiction over domestic courts.
13. Both Power and Ronayne consider Cambodia to have constituted a genocide, despite the fact that the main target for murder was a political or class group, which was excluded in compromise with the Soviets in 1948 so that the Genocide statute would not have applied to crimes against class enemies in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other communist regimes.
14. Although regular newspaper accounts were provided in all three cases, the Holocaust was also reported directly to President Roosevelt by Jan Karski and others of the Polish underground and concentration camp refugees as well as reports from U.S. and British overflight photos of Auschwitz.
